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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for understanding value-added and
abuse prevention activities in business processes.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper considers business processes as a regulation
mechanism that an organization uses to survive and flourish in its environment. It proposes a
theoretical framework based on the concept of homeostasis, the maintenance of identity in a changing
world. In this framework the paper classifies business processes into three levels (strategic,
operational, regulative) and analyse the relationships between these three levels. Based on this
framework, the paper extends the “Use and Misuse Cases” technique to support modelling of
value-added and abuse prevention activities.
Findings – The main finding is the importance of considering business processes as regulation
mechanisms. Traditionally, business processes are analysed through the goals they are designed to
achieve. This paper analyses what the organization aims at maintaining. This makes it possible
to explicitly model the potential abuses (threats) to business processes and their associated corrective
measures (regulative processes).
Practical implications – Use of this framework enables process designers to explicitly model abuse
prevention activities, even though they are traditionally considered as not participating in customer
value creation. This should lead to better-fitting business processes.
Originality/value – The framework is useful because it provides a theoretical justification for the
value creation and abuse prevention activities that can be found in business processes. The three levels
that we use to analyse business processes (strategic, operational and regulative) constitute an
innovation in business process modelling where only two levels (strategic and operational) have been
considered thus far. Few, if any, business process theoretical frameworks provide this kind of rationale
for abuse prevention activities.
Keywords Organizational processes, Modelling, Systems theory
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
An organization’s business processes are sets of activities that create value for a
customer (Hammer and Champy, 1993). However, not all business activities directly
participate in this creation of value. As stated by Hammer and Champy, business
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processes also contain activities designed to prevent abuse; many business processes
contain too much abuse prevention, whose cost may surpass the cost of abuse.
Thus, to define a complete business process, an organization needs to understand
what value it wants to provide to its customers, what potential abuses it may face, and
what actions it can take to protect itself.
Standard process modelling techniques model the activities in a process, without
differentiating between those that create value and those that prevent abuse. Moreover,
they do not model potential abuse explicitly. As a result, these modelling techniques do
not include the rationale for abuse prevention. This missing rationale may result in
either inflexibility during redesign or ignoring essential abuse prevention activities.
In this paper, we present an innovative theoretical framework based on general
systems thinking (GST) and cybernetics. The framework explains business processes
as a mechanism through which an organization regulates its relationships with its
stakeholders. This framework provides the necessary background for modelling
business processes with a technique that models value creation and abuse prevention
activities with use cases, and potential abuses with misuse cases. This technique is
inherited from requirements engineering (RE). It helps in the design or redesign of
business processes by making value creation, abuses and countermeasures explicit.
The larger context of this work is the modelling of the rationale of business
processes, the so-called “why question”. Several goal-directed techniques have been
defined in RE as solutions to this question (Yu and Mylopoulos, 1994; Anton, 1997; van
Lamsweerde, 2001). Related techniques exist in the systems sciences movement
(Checkland and Scholes, 1990; Forrester, 1971) and in information systems (Coakes
et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2002). Our background in GST and RE leads us to propose a
lightweight, graphical technique that throws light on value creation, abuse and
counter-abuse measures. It is useful in the early stages of a project and for discussion
with non-technical stakeholders; it is not designed for detailed business process
description. However, it provides a rationale for value creation and abuse prevention
activities which can be revisited to reassess the adequacy of the business process
model.
This paper is structured in the following way. In the second section, we briefly
explain the role of business processes in the regulation of the relationships between an
organization and its stakeholders. We then explain our theoretical framework for
understanding business processes and for modelling them with use and misuse cases.
In the third section, we explain the concepts of use and misuse cases and show how
they can be used to model business processes with the help of the theoretical
framework. In the fourth section, we apply the modelling technique to a simplified case
study of a private bank facing money laundering. In the fifth section, we review
relevant related work. Finally, we conclude and outline potential future work.
The regulative role of business processes
The traditional view of business processes as sets of activities designed to achieve a
well-defined goal (Hammer and Champy, 1993) can be enriched by considering
businesses as open systems that regulate relationships with their environment
(Checkland and Scholes, 1990; Regev, 2003). From this viewpoint, inherited from GST
(Weinberg and Weinberg, 1988) and cybernetics (Ashby, 1956), a business has
relationships with stakeholders in its environment. These relationships are necessary
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for the business to maintain its identity as distinct from other businesses. Maintaining
a separate identity defines a business’ success and survival. For example, Compaq lost
its separate identity when it merged with HP due to its declining success, whereas Dell
has managed to maintain a separate identity.
Relationships with stakeholders are necessary for a business but are also potentially
harmful. Having relationships with customers, for example, is obviously necessary,
but customers who demand too much of the business can contribute to its demise.
This is true of all other relationships that the business maintains with stakeholders
such as employees, suppliers, and investors.
To understand how the identity of a business is kept more or less stable in such a
complicated environment, it is useful to introduce the concept of homeostasis drawn
from the field of physiology.
The principles of homeostasis, first enunciated by the physiologist Walter
B. Cannon (Weinberg and Weinberg, 1988) provide a set of heuristics that explain how
the identity of a system is kept stable in an unstable environment. These principles,
restated in business process vocabulary are:
. in a business subjected continually to disturbing conditions, stability is in itself
evidence that one or more processes are in place to maintain this stability;
. if the business remains stable it is because any tendency towards change
automatically results in increased effectiveness of processes that resist change;
. to keep a business stable, a number of cooperating processes may be brought
into action at the same time or successively; and
. when a process can change an inherently stable state, it is reasonable to look for
automatic control of this process or for processes that have an opposite effect, in
order to avoid overcompensation.
We call norm the state of a given relationship that the business attempts to maintain
unchanged (Vickers, 1968, 1987; Liu et al., 2002). The number of norms that a business
maintains is very large. Examples of such norms are the stability of a business’ name,
its reputation, its revenues, its profits, its number of employees, etc. The norms
maintained by the business define its identity. A norm is stable but not necessarily
static. It may change over time as the business adapts to its environment, for example,
when the revenues grow as the business adapts to a growing market. A steady growth
or decline is also a kind of norm, for example, a steady revenue growth.
Norms very often depend on each other (Weinberg and Weinberg, 1988). For
example, the norm represented by employee benefits is usually dependent on the norm
represented by its profits. High profits usually translate into high employee benefits.
When profits decline it is difficult to cut employee benefits because the lifestyles of the
employees themselves depend on the norms that their benefits represent. Employees
are likely to take action (as suggested by the homeostatic principles) if their benefits
are reduced. Thus, at any given time, the norm gives a reference point from which to
judge the current state of affairs (Vickers, 1987, p. 14).
We call strategic level, the level where the norms to which the business’s
relationships need to adhere to are defined and modified as a result of changes within
the business and in its environment. Norms can be defined proactively as in
planning or in retrospect when the business settles in them without prior planning
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(Mintzberg et al., 1998). Maintaining and modifying these norms implies continuous
effort, as suggested by the principles of homeostasis. In RE these efforts are
represented by the concept of maintenance goal (Regev and Wegmann, 2002).
The principles of homeostasis show that we should expect successful businesses to
have processes in place that set unconditional barriers to change in their norms,
processes that detect such change, and processes that act conditionally when such
change is detected.
In our theoretical framework we, therefore, distinguish between operational
processes, which unconditionally maintain a relationship with a stakeholder in a given
norm, and the regulative processes, which are applied conditionally when an
operational process fails to maintain the relationship within the norm. In a bank, for
example, processes defined for taking customer orders and fulfilling them maintain the
customer relationship within a prescribed norm. Detecting money-laundering
activities, however, may require the processing of several financial transactions.
The pattern may not be detectable by the execution of order taking and order
fulfillment processes. Separate processes for identifying money laundering patterns,
and addressing them, are needed.
Our framework thus contains the three levels summarized below:
(1) the strategic level contains the relationships with stakeholders, the norms with
which these relationships need to comply;
(2) the operational level contains the unconditional processes that the business has
developed to maintain its relationships with stakeholders within the norms, i.e.
to unconditionally regulate the relationship; and
(3) the regulative level contains the processes that are applied when operational
processes fail to maintain a relationship within a given norm when a threat is
presented, i.e. to conditionally regulate the relationship.
This framework enables us to reflect on processes that apparently do not provide value
to a customer but are necessary for the survival and success of the business in the face
of threats to its norms. These threats can originate within the business or from its
environment.
Notice that the addition of a regulative level is a novelty in itself, as most
frameworks only distinguish between the strategic and operational levels. In the next
section, we explain the use and misuse case technique, and show how our framework
can enhance this technique in order to use it to supply a rationale for value-added and
abuse prevention processes.
Modelling business processes with use and misuse cases
Use cases were proposed by Jacobson et al. (1992). The idea was to capture brief
narratives describing possible uses of the system under design as distinct cases;
these could then supposedly be implemented in the design one at a time. Each narrative
would be named as a use case and diagrammed as a white elliptical bubble. The role
principally involved with the use case (the “actor”) would be diagrammed as a
stick-man, linked to the bubble as in Figure 1.
Cockburn (2001) extended Jacobson’s use case concept by identifying the use case’s
name as a functional goal, and by documenting a suggested structure for use cases, to
include a primary or main success scenario, as well as exception (he called them
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“extension”) scenarios to handle undesired events. He made it clear that use cases
documented system behaviour desired by people (or possibly other intelligent agents)
playing specific system roles. The unified modelling language (OMG, 2003) documents
functional requirements with use cases.
The name “use case” was clearly intended by Jacobson to apply only to uses of a
system, but scenario modelling has long been applied much more widely, e.g. for
military planning and film storyboarding (Alexander, 2002d), so there is really no a
priori reason why use case-type scenarios should not be applied to business process
modelling. Some practitioners find the use case approach convenient for thinking about
business processes as well as system behaviour, and document processes as scenarios
using use case notation for their context diagrams (Robertson and Robertson, 1999).
In use case modelling, processes are modelled primarily as scenarios (sequences of
activities); these are not visible in the diagram, which only names the goal of each
process.
Sindre and Opdahl (2000, 2001) further extended the modelling range by
introducing the idea of the misuse case to document negative security scenarios. They
inverted the colours of the use case to indicate the undesired intentions of a hostile
agent (Figure 2). The behaviour of a hostile agent results in a loss to the business or its
stakeholders (Sindre and Opdahl, 2001).
A misuse case documents conscious and active opposition in the form of a goal that
a hostile agent intends to achieve, but which the organization perceives as detrimental
to some of its goals. This is a stronger sort of problem than an “Obstacle”
(van Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000) which suggests passively getting in the way of a
desired goal. In particular, an obstacle does not react by creatively devising
counter-measures when it is surmounted. A hostile agent and its misuse cases imply a
dynamic and intelligent pattern of threats, not just the threatening goals actually
named.
This opens the way to a game-playing or MiniMax view of process modelling. Both
the organization and its opponents (such as criminals and business rivals) act
intelligently to discover and play their best move, which is – as in games like chess
and go – whatever best counters their opponent’s best move. In our previous work, we
proposed two new relationships, threatens and mitigates, to model the resulting
zigzagging arms race between the players (Alexander, 2002b, c). A misuse case is
Figure 2.
Sindre and Opdahl
misuse case
Figure 1.
Use case diagram
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relevant only if it threatens the goal of a use case in the same model. Analysis may
reveal one or more candidate counter-measures to the threat, and these may be
documented as lower-level use cases that mitigate the threat posed by the misuse case.
The use cases are the responsibility of the roles shown on the left, as in
Figure 3; the misuse case is owned by the negative role on the right. Higher-level
use cases are shown furthest left; successively lower-level use cases are shown
further towards the right. Relationships between use cases are shown as arrows;
four types of relationship are visible in the diagram, namely includes, has
exception, threatens, and mitigates.
Normally, one role has the primary responsibility for a given use case – sales is
responsible for selling – though other secondary roles may also be involved. Roles
may be filled by either human or machine agents, as long as these have sufficient
intelligence for the tasks involved.
The models in this paper are based on use/misuse case models constructed with
Scenario Plus, a free toolkit for use with the requirements tool DOORS (Scenario Plus,
2003; DOORS, 2003). The toolkit provides a rich set of options for the modeller,
including model creation, editing, linking, checking, metrics, and export. The resulting
technique is suitable for a wide range of purposes, most obviously security threat
mitigation, but also reasoning in design space for trade-off and conflict analysis as we
have shown in a previous work (Alexander, 2002a).
To use this technique for business process modelling, we propose to model the
strategic level norms, the operational processes, and the regulative processes of the
business with use cases, and the threats the business believes it faces as misuse cases.
The legitimate stakeholders are modelled as actors, and the rest as hostile agents.
Figure 3 shows a use case establish reputation being threatened by a misuse case
launder money, which in turn is mitigated by the use case check money laundering.
This has an exception, a regulative use case alert authorities, which corrects for a
possible deviation from the norm of not allowing money-laundering activities. We
extend Sindre and Opdahl’s technique by delimiting the business’s actors and use
cases with a rectangle and by adding a stereotype to the use cases to show the level
(strategic, operational, regulative) at which we classify them.
Notice that the hostile agent is only hostile from the point of view of the business or
even of an individual process. The “hostile agent” may be a bona-fide customer of the
Figure 3.
Documenting threat and
mitigation with use and
misuse cases
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organization who performs actions without understanding their implications, or a
customer who sometimes has behaviour that the organization dislikes.
The case of the private bank
In this section we show how the use/misuse case approach, coupled with our
theoretical framework, can be used to model business processes. We use the simplified
example of a private bank that needs to address money-laundering issues. This
example is inspired by a reengineering project conducted at a Swiss portfolio
management company.
The service offered by private banks can easily be used as a tool for laundering
money earned illicitly. Taking measures to protect against money laundering is not
directly part of the service a private bank provides to its clients. However, accepting
money-laundering activities sets the bank outside of the norm established by countries
and international organizations, such as the Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF,
2003) recommendations. These recommendations strongly encourage financial
institutions to monitor for money laundering and take regulative action when such
activity is detected. Below, we show how our use/misuse case approach can be used to
model the processes of a private bank subject to the FATF recommendations. Because
of space constraints we only consider a small subset of these that we call the country
recommendations.
We consider that the country recommendations specify that client identity be
verified when client accounts are opened, that transaction amounts exceeding a certain
threshold be considered as suspect, that the origin of funds be verified, and that
transaction records be kept for a period of five years. This gives us a pattern of threats
from criminals who try to invest money anonymously, under false identity, who want
to invest illegal funds, and who invest large sums of money in one transaction.
Figure 4 shows the strategic level for the private bank. At this level we consider the
following use cases for the bank, maintain business, establish good reputation and
comply with country regulations. The relevant actors are the bank’s director and the
bank’s client. The hostile agents are the criminal and the country authority. The bank
maintains its identity by doing business with clients. As part of this identity, the bank
establishes the good reputation needed for customers to trust it with managing their
portfolios. This reputation, a norm, is threatened by people, “criminals”, who want to
launder money earned illegally. Country authorities may also tarnish this reputation,
i.e. create deviations from the norm, by launching probes into the bank’s activities if
they suspect that it is used for money laundering. These two threats are represented as
Figure 4.
Strategic level use and
misuse cases for the
private bank
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the misuse cases launder money and probe bank operations. The use case comply with
country regulations mitigates both of these threats. Notice that the country authority is
represented as a hostile agent whereas it could appear elsewhere as a cooperating
actor, illustrating the complexity of relationships with stakeholders.
Figure 5 adds operational level use cases. The use case enrol new clients represent a
process that maintains the bank’s revenue stream and hence its identity; it is, therefore,
included by the use case maintain business. The use case provides ROI to clients both
helps the bank to establish its good reputation and maintains its revenue stream (the
bank is paid commission relative to the return on investment it provides to its clients).
This use case is, therefore, included by both of the strategic use cases.
In this model, the bank’s customer representative is responsible for enrolling new
clients. The account manager for a given client’s account is responsible for providing
the return on investment to clients. However, clients can also place orders themselves,
by contacting the bank’s customer representative. By providing these services, the
bank becomes vulnerable to money laundering threats and needs to regulate access to
these services to prevent their abuse.
The model in Figure 5 shows that the verify client identity use case mitigates the
threat from the misuse cases invest under false identity and invest anonymously.
Indeed, merely asking for the identity of a client may deter those who want to launder
money anonymously. Verifying that the identity provided by the client is genuine may
Figure 5.
Operational level use and
misuse cases for the
private bank
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deter those who want to launder money using a false identity. Similarly, the use case
verify origin of funds mitigates the threat from those who want to invest illegally
obtained funds irrespective of their identity.
Figure 5 shows two more use cases recommended by the country recommendations.
These are Keep transaction records for five years and monitor transaction amounts.
These use cases in themselves do not mitigate any threat. However, they serve as the
needed norm for the regulative use cases reject suspicious clients, reject if transaction
amount above threshold, and alert authorities in case of suspicion shown in Figure 6.
These are invoked only when the norm of dealing with trustworthy clients who
perform normal transaction is violated. They are then considered as mitigating the
threat from money laundering.
Figure 6.
The complete use and
misuse cases for the
private bank
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In this section we have shown how a use/misuse case model can provide a valuable
rationale for the processes of a private bank based on the relationships the bank wants
to establish with its stakeholders and threats to these relationships. This rationale is
either inclusion in a higher-level process or mitigation of an explicit threat. This
enables process engineers to identify and document when a given process is needed.
When conditions change, e.g. when money-laundering patterns mutate, relevant
processes can be revisited, modified, or removed. Notice, though, that some processes
are performed for several reasons and need to be maintained even when some
documented threats that they mitigate are considered not to exist any more. For
example, get client identity and keep transaction records for five years are necessary
for mitigating other threats, such as queries by tax authorities, and should probably be
kept regardless of the threat from money laundering.
Related work
The number of candidate techniques for redesigning business processes is large.
These techniques originate in many disciplines. In this section we will mention some of
the most prominent, and briefly discuss the way our technique differs from them.
Use case-related techniques
Use case diagrams can be used to provide rough models of business processes but they
do not include the rationale for these processes. An emerging ITU standard, use case
maps (ITU, 2002) offers a graphical notation for a more detailed description of
behaviour with the aim of specifying so-called functional requirements, but like use
case diagrams these do not include the rationale for the processes they describe.
Sindre and Opdahl proposed and applied the misuse case technique to develop
security requirements for IT systems. The theoretical background we propose in this
paper makes this technique suitable for business process redesign.
Business process modelling
Many business process modelling methods exist; for example, Workflow, ARIS,
IDEF0, IDEF3, Petri Nets, UML activity diagrams and sequence diagrams, etc. All of
those include a graphical representation, a diagram, of the activities that compose a
process. However, none of the methods we know includes the rationale for the activities
that compose a process. Some rationale is hidden in messages received from the
environment, as can be done in UML activity diagrams, but this is rather implicit.
Systems thinking-based techniques
Soft system methodology (SSM) (Checkland and Scholes, 1990) and system dynamics
(SD) (Forrester, 1971; Senge et al., 1999) are two methods that have evolved from the
systems sciences movement. SSM uses activity diagrams called Rich Pictures and SD
uses SD diagrams. Both rich pictures and SD can be used to model business processes.
SD as presented in Senge et al. (1999) uses the concept of constraint but does not make
it clear from where the constraint comes from. Furthermore, a constraint is a weaker
form of a threat. SSM includes measure and control activities in its rich pictures, which
could be compared to the regulative processes in our framework. However, it is not
made clear, in the SSM literature, why these activities are necessary, e.g. for threat
mitigation.
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Goal-oriented requirements engineering techniques
Many goal-oriented techniques have been developed in the field of RE. The most
prominent being KAOS (Dardenne et al., 1993; van Lamsweerde and Letier, 2000),
GBRAM (Anton, 1997), i * (Yu and Mylopoulos, 1994), GRL (ITU, 2001), etc. Some of
them, in particular i * have been applied for business process reengineering. GRL is an
evolution of i * and is used for specifying non-functional requirements as part of the
user requirements notation of which UCM is the functional part.
KAOS and GBRAM specify the concepts of constraints and obstacles that prevent
the achievement of goals. As we argued in this paper, these represent weaker forms of
the threats that we consider in our technique. Furthermore, these techniques do not
include a graphical notation that can be used to reason about the models with
stakeholders.
i * and GRL do provide a graphical notation where networks of dependencies
between actors who depend on each others to achieve goals are specified. These
dependencies are only positive dependencies. Threats such as the ones we represent
cannot be conveniently and explicitly represented.
Business-oriented techniques
BPR techniques (Hammer and Champy, 1993; Kueng and Kawalek, 1997) specify that
abuse-prevention activities should be kept to a minimum. However, they do not
provide a framework for designing abuse prevention activities except by specifying
that their cost (mainly financial) should not outweigh the protection they offer.
Balanced scorecards (BSC) (Kaplan and Norton, 1996) is a technique that models a
business in four dimensions – financial, internal business processes, learning and
growth, and customer. The internal business processes is the dimension where existing
processes are analysed and new ones are invented. BSC subscribes to a theory similar
to the one underlying BPR. Business processes are developed from the point of view of
the value they provide to customers and the financial returns that they bring to the
business. No threat-prevention activities are explored.
In the field of organizational semiotics (Liu et al., 2002) business processes are
thought of as norms of behaviour of an organization. These norms are extracted from
descriptions of the organization’s current processes. The meaning of the norms for
different people within the organization is analysed. Use cases are derived from these
norms (Shishkov et al., 2002). The rationale for these norms and the way they are
maintained is not explicitly represented.
Conclusions
In this paper we described a theoretical framework for understanding business
processes and a modelling technique that can be used for process redesign. The
theoretical framework is based on a proven theory from another field, homeostasis
(from biology). Homeostasis shows that deviation from a norm is a powerful catalyst
for action and, therefore, for business process definition.
The framework is useful because it provides a theoretical justification for the value
creation and abuse prevention activities that can be found in business processes.
The three levels that we use to analyse business processes (strategic, operational and
regulative) constitute an innovation in business process modelling where only two
levels (strategic and operational) have been considered thus far. Explicitly modelling
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the potential abuses (threats) to business processes and their associated corrective
measures (regulative processes) becomes possible during process redesign. We believe
that few if any business process theoretical frameworks provide this kind of
rationale for abuse prevention activities.
The modelling technique is an extension of the use/misuse case technique,
developed in RE. Its purpose is to provide an overall understanding of the business
processes and their rationale. It is not intended to provide a detailed description of
business processes. Initial experience with this technique was gained by describing
trade-offs for a railway design workshop (Alexander, 2002a). The workshop was able
to advance rapidly from a previously stuck position once all participants understood
the nature of the conflicting pressures on the design.
Rationale in the form of threats can be thought of as a business’ belief about itself
and its environment. Such beliefs can bring about the feared threats, as the business
partly constructs its environment in its image. Also, a focus on threats can result in
paralysis, but can also create opportunities for learning and constructively modifying
business processes.
Hence, future work could include:
. Research into the way threats are interpreted by organizations and the effects of
these interpretations on the business and its environment.
. Threat-oriented extensions to detailed business process design techniques, such
as IDEF, UCM.
. Extension of use/misuse case diagrams with argumentation artefacts to help
select the right amount of regulative processes to avoid antagonising
stakeholders. Such artefacts could be borrowed from goal-oriented methods
such as GRL, from problem-solving methods such as IBIS (Conklin et al., 2001),
or from design rationale methods such as QOC (MacLean et al., 1989).
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